subidx/internal
lakshit verma 509fe9bab8
tailer: verify fetched entries against the signed root before ingest
Every fetched batch must now prove itself: before ingesting, the
tailer picks one cryptographically random entry, fetches its
get-proof-by-hash audit path, and verifies locally that the entry
hashes up to the currently verified STH root. Entries served outside
the signed tree — by a tampered connection or a misbehaving log —
fail the check, the batch is refused, the watermark does not advance,
and the cycle retries. Before this, entries were trusted purely on
TLS to the log endpoint; only the STH was verified.

The fake log in tests now serves a real RFC 6962 Merkle root and
audit paths, so the existing round-trip test exercises the gate, and
TestTamperedEntriesRejected proves that entries outside the signed
tree are never stored and never advance the watermark.

README updated: the provenance claim now matches what the code does.
2026-08-24 01:04:41 +05:30
..
apex apex,tailer: normalize ingest names to punycode 2026-08-21 21:42:54 +05:30
loglist loglist,tailer: support the frozen log state 2026-08-24 00:44:05 +05:30
rfc6962 rfc6962: implement Merkle leaf hashes and inclusion proof verification 2026-08-24 01:02:59 +05:30
server server: fail closed when a limiter shard is full 2026-08-24 00:42:04 +05:30
store store: gofmt after sort import 2026-08-24 00:39:08 +05:30
tailer tailer: verify fetched entries against the signed root before ingest 2026-08-24 01:04:41 +05:30