lakshit verma 509fe9bab8 tailer: verify fetched entries against the signed root before ingest ... Every fetched batch must now prove itself: before ingesting, the tailer picks one cryptographically random entry, fetches its get-proof-by-hash audit path, and verifies locally that the entry hashes up to the currently verified STH root. Entries served outside the signed tree — by a tampered connection or a misbehaving log — fail the check, the batch is refused, the watermark does not advance, and the cycle retries. Before this, entries were trusted purely on TLS to the log endpoint; only the STH was verified. The fake log in tests now serves a real RFC 6962 Merkle root and audit paths, so the existing round-trip test exercises the gate, and TestTamperedEntriesRejected proves that entries outside the signed tree are never stored and never advance the watermark. README updated: the provenance claim now matches what the code does.		2026-08-24 01:04:41 +05:30
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tailer.go	tailer: verify fetched entries against the signed root before ingest	2026-08-24 01:04:41 +05:30
tailer_test.go	tailer: verify fetched entries against the signed root before ingest	2026-08-24 01:04:41 +05:30